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Medical Negligence, Causation and “Exceptional Cases” under 
the Civil Liability Legislation  
 
Powney v Kerang and District Health [2014] VSCA 221, Victorian Court of Appeal,  
11 September 2014 
 
Pursuant to the civil liability legislation enacted in most Australian jurisdictions, factual causation 
will be established if, on the balance of probabilities,1 the claimant can prove that the defendant’s 
negligence was ‘a necessary condition of the occurrence of the [claimant’s] harm’.2  This will be 
satisfied by showing that the harm would not have occurred ‘but for’ the defendant’s breach of their 
duty of care.3  However, in an exceptional or appropriate case,4 sub-section 2 of the legislation 
provides that if the ‘but for’ test is not met, factual causation may instead be determined in 
accordance with other ‘established principles’.  In such a case, ‘the court is to consider (amongst 
other relevant things) whether or not and why responsibility for the harm should be imposed’ on the 
negligent party.5 
 
According to the Review of the Law of Negligence (Ipp Report),6 the instances falling within sub-
section 2 would include cases involving ‘evidentiary gaps’ such as Bonnington Castings v 
Wardlaw7 and Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services.8  These arise where two or more separate 
factors, or breaches, operate either cumulatively or individually in a way such that neither science 
nor medicine can determine their relative contribution to a claimant’s harm in a manner that 
satisfies the ‘but for’ test.  Nevertheless, a sufficient causal connection is established by showing 
that the defendant’s wrongful act or omission has instead materially increased the risk of the harm 
occurring.  
 
In Powney v Kerang and District Health, the Victorian Court of Appeal considered the application 
to negligence actions of the ‘evidentiary gap provision’ in section 51(2) of the Wrongs Act 1958 
(Vic).  
 
Facts 
In August 2008, Mr Powney was admitted for nasal surgery to a hospital operated and controlled by 
the respondent.  He experienced nasal pain post-surgery and was given an intramuscular injection of 
pethidine in his left arm.  Following discharge from hospital the next day, Mr Powney ‘developed a 
severe infection in his left upper arm, which progressed to septicaemia with a significant abscess in 
the arm’.9 The abscess ultimately required surgical drainage.   
 
                                                 
1 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5E; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 12; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 52; Civil Liability 
Act 1936 (SA) s 35; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5D; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 14; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 
2002 (ACT) s 46. 
2 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5D(1)(a); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 11(1)(a); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 
51(1)(a); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 34(1)(a); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5C(1)(a); Civil Liability Act 2002 
(Tas) s 13(1)(a) (necessary ‘element’ of the occurrence of the harm); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 45 (1)(a) 
(necessary condition of the ‘happening’ of the harm). 
3 See, eg, Wallace v Kam (2013) 250 CLR 375, 383. 
4 Rather than in ‘exceptional’ or ‘appropriate’ cases, section 34(2) of the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) and section 45(2) 
of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) apply where a claimant is ‘exposed to a similar risk of harm by a number of 
different persons’. 
5 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5D(2).  See also Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 11(2); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 
51(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5C(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 13(2).   
6 David Andrew Ipp, Australian Treasury, Review of the Law of Negligence: Final Report (2002) 109-111. See also 
Strong v Woolworths Ltd (t/as Big W) (2012) 246 CLR 182, 193-4; Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak (2009) 239 CLR 
420, 442-4; Powney v Kerang and District Health [2014] VSCA 221, [46]-[61], [81]-[83]. 
7 [1956] AC 613. 
8 [2002] 3 All ER 305. 
9 [2014] VSCA 221, [12]. 
 2
Mr Powney claimed that his pethidine injection had been performed through the use of an uncapped 
and unsterile needle, and that this negligent administration of the injection had caused his infection, 
leading him to sustain ‘significant permanent injury to his left arm with an associated psychiatric 
condition’.10  He also alleged that prior to discharge, hospital staff had failed to act upon 
‘complaints that he was suffering pain and symptoms in his left arm’ as a consequence of the 
infection.11  The respondent, while accepting that the injection was the source of the infection, 
denied any negligence or that any such negligence had caused Mr Powney’s harm.12 
 
Decision at First Instance 
At trial13 before a jury on the issue of causation, it was accepted that performance of the injection 
without negligence carried a small risk of infection.  Nevertheless, Dr Hudson gave evidence for Mr 
Powney ‘that the risk of infection from an intramuscular injection would have been reduced if 
appropriate steps had been taken in [its] administration’.14  However, upon cross-examination ‘[h]e 
accepted that he could not conclude that but for the failure to take precautions the infection would 
not have occurred’.15 Dr Eisen, for the respondent, similarly concluded that: 
 
if the injecting nurse used a needle which had been uncapped for a period of minutes, and 
which had been placed and transported in a kidney dish without a cap, the risk of infection 
would not be significantly increased … it would take a period of months to years for an 
uncapped needle to become overtly contaminated.16 
 
However, the experts disagreed ‘as to the time required between the administration of the injection 
by which bacteria were inoculated into a patient’s body and the development of clinical 
manifestations of infection’.17  This was relevant to the issue of whether any failure to address Mr 
Powney’s complaints was causative of his harm, in terms of whether, if addressed, it would have 
been possible to diagnose and treat the infection at that time.   
 
Consequently, on the ninth day of the twelve day trial and at the conclusion of evidence, the 
appellant’s counsel submitted that if the jury considered the ‘but for’ test to be unsatisfied, it should 
be open for them to consider whether it was an appropriate case for the application of section 51(2) 
of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic). This submission was stated to be ‘critically important’ on the ‘needle 
stick aspect’ of causation18 and appears to have been made in an attempt to suggest, contrary to 
Amaca Pty Ltd v Booth,19 that causation may be established on the basis of ‘expert evidence 
suggesting reasonable precautions which may reduce the risk of injury.’20 
 
 
The trial judge rejected counsel’s submission and the jury returned a finding of no liability.  The 
decision to confine the jury to a consideration of factual causation according to the ‘but for’ test 
under section 51(1)(a) of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), and to preclude the jury’s consideration of 
sub-section 2, was appealed as an error of law.21 
 
                                                 
10 Ibid [13]. 
11 Ibid [15].  See also [4]. 
12 Ibid [16]. 
13 Powney v Kerang and District Health (Unreported, County Court of Victoria, Judge Parish, 19 September 2013) 
14 [2014] VSCA 221, [27]. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid [28]. 
17 Ibid [29]. 
18 Ibid [33]. 
19 (2011) 246 CL R 36, 53 (French CJ) (‘Causation in tort is not established merely because the allegedly tortious act or 
omission increased a risk of injury.  The risk of an occurrence and the cause of the occurrence are quite different 
things’) referring to Roads and Traffic Authority v Royal (2008) 82 ALJR 870, 898 (Kiefel J). 
20 [2014] VSCA 221, [98]. 
21 Ibid [5]-[6], [41]. 
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Decision on Appeal 
While recognising that factual causation under section 51(1)(a) was a question of fact for the jury 
(or judge sitting as the arbiter of fact),22 in relation to the specific issue on appeal, the Victorian 
Court of Appeal (Osborn and Beach JJA and Forrest AJA) held that the trial judge was ‘correct in 
refusing to permit the jury to consider the requirements of section 51(2)’.23  A number of reasons 
were given for this decision: 
 
Firstly, to engage sub-section 2, it is at the outset necessary to determine that factual causation 
under sub-section (1)(a) cannot be shown. However, in Powney, counsel ‘went to the jury on the 
basis that factual causation was established.’24  Secondly, and reflective of the High Court in Adeels 
Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak,25 although the legislation does not define when a case will be 
exceptional or ‘appropriate’ for the purpose of sub-section 2,26 it does specify that this is to be 
determined ‘in accordance with established principles’.  Accordingly, whether or when the 
provision is relevant can only be resolved following ‘judicial scrutiny’27 of: prior authority allowing 
departure from the ‘but for’ test; and the normative, or legal policy, issue of whether or not and why 
liability should be imposed.  As such, it is a question of law for the judge, not the jury as the trier of 
fact.  However, at no time in Powney had it been submitted that the trial judge resolve this issue.28  
Thirdly, the court also held that ‘there would have been a sound basis for the trial judge to reject’ 
the appellant’s submission on the application of sub-section 2 ‘on the basis that it was unheralded 
and made too late in the case’.29  Their Honours further stated that if reliance is to be placed upon 
section 51(2) ‘as providing the appropriate causal link between a negligent act and attributing 
responsibility for the alleged consequential harm to a defendant, the basis of the claim should be set 
out in the pleadings, or at the very least, raised as an issue at the commencement of the trial.’30  
 
Finally, the court confirmed that sub-section 2 was not intended to apply as some sort of backup 
provision whenever a claimant cannot establish factual causation via conventional means.  Rather, 
as supported by the Ipp Report, Parliamentary Debate31 and Explanatory Memorandum:32      
 
it was designed to accommodate cases quite out of the ordinary – particularly those 
involving exposures to a particular agent on multiple occasions, all of which contributed to a 
disease process but factual causation could not be attributed to a specific exposure.  
Alternatively, it was to be employed where scientific evidence may be developing in 
identifying the level of exposure to a particular agent necessary to produce injury.33 
 
If otherwise available, it was therefore considered inappropriate, in accordance with established 
principles, to apply section 51(2) to impose responsibility upon the respondent in circumstances 
such as those of Mr Powney – where there was ‘one alleged tortious act and no question of multiple 
causes or unknown aetiology of the alleged damage’.34 Instead the case was regarded as amounting 
to a simple ‘failure to prove what was in truth a very weak case’ on the issue of factual causation.35 
 
Despite this conclusion, the Court of Appeal’s decision does not conclusively determine the types 
of cases falling within sub-section 2 of the causation provisions enacted via Australia’s civil 
                                                 
22 Ibid [80].  See also [93]. 
23 Ibid [7].  See also [84]. 
24 Ibid [95].  See further [102]-[109]. 
25 (2009) 239 CLR 420, 443. 
26 As mentioned at above n 4, an exception may be found in section 34(2) of the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) and 
section 45(2) of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT). 
27 [2014] VSCA 221, [85].  See also [86]-[93]. 
28 Ibid [94]. 
29 Ibid [100]. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 30 October 2003, 1427 (John Brumby). 
32 Explanatory Memorandum, Wrongs and Other Acts (Law of Negligence) Bill 2003 (Vic) 4-5. 
33 [2014] VSCA 221, [96].  See also [97].   
34 Ibid [99]. 
35 Ibid [98]. 
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liability legislation.  Indeed, the court considered it ‘inappropriate’ to engage in such a task.36  It is 
therefore doubtless that this will be the subject of further litigation both in and outside the medical 
negligence area. Nevertheless, the case does confirm a cautious approach to the future application 
of the sub-section.   
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